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OREGON NUMBER 3
LAW REVIEW
DAVID MEDINE*
The Adverse Testimony Privilege:
Time to Dispose of a
"Sentimental Relic"
S INCE 1580, the common law has recognized a privilege not to
testify against one's spouse.' Known as the adverse testimony
privilege,2 it has been referred to as a "sentimental relic,"3 largely
because it is grounded on precepts that have long since been re-
jected. Originally based on the incapacity of one spouse to testify
for or against the other spouse,4 the privilege is now viewed as nec-
essary to preserve marital harmony and to avoid the repugnant
prospect of one spouse's testimony being used to convict the other
spouse.5 Courts and legislatures have created numerous exceptions
to the privilege over the course of its history. In 1980, the Supreme
Court significantly narrowed the privilege in federal cases so that
only the spouse who is a witness, not the spouse who is a party, can
* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University at Bloomington. B.A., 1975,
Hampshire College; J.D., 1978, University of Chicago. I wish to thank Carol Juliet
Weil and J. Alexander Tanford for their encouragement and criticism.
I See Bent v. Allot, 21 Eng. Rep. 50 (Ch. 1580).
2 It has also been referred to as the antimarital facts privilege, 8 J. WIGMORE, Evi-
DENCE §§ 2227-2245 (McNaughton ed. 1961), and spousal immunity, Lempert, A Right
to Every Woman's Evidence, 66 IOWA L. REV. 725, 726 (1981).
3 Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 81 (1958) (Stewart, J., concurring).
4 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 43-44 (1980).
5 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2228, at 216-17.
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invoke it. 6
This Article examines the application of and the policy rationales
underlying the adverse testimony privilege. Part I of the Article
clarifies the distinction between the adverse testimony privilege and
the confidential marital communications privilege which protects
against disclosure of private conversations and acts between hus-
band and wife. This part also reviews the origins and development
of the adverse testimony privilege. Part II discusses the exceptions
to the adverse testimony privilege and demonstrates how these ex-
ceptions undercut the policies allegedly underlying the privilege.
Part III considers the policy and legal theory currently underlying
the privilege. Finally, Part IV concludes that the privilege no
longer serves its function sufficiently to outweigh society's compet-
ing interest in obtaining truth, and consequently, proposes its
abolition.
I
BACKGROUND
A. Distinguishing the Two Marital Privileges
There are two privileges which are sometimes referred to inter-
changeably as the marital privilege: the privilege protecting confi-
dential marital communications ("confidential communications
privilege")7 and the privilege preventing testimony by one spouse
against the other ("adverse testimony privilege").
The adverse testimony privilege traditionally gave the defendant
in a criminal case the right to prevent adverse testimony by his or
her spouse.' It covers both confidential and nonconfidential infor-
6 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. at 53 ("[T]he existing rule should be modified
so that the witness-spouse alone has a privilege to refuse to testify adversely; the witness
may be neither compelled to testify nor foreclosed from testifying.")
7 This privilege is recognized in about 40 American jurisdictions including the federal
courts. Comment, Questioning the Marital Privilege. A Medieval Philosophy in a Mod-
ern World, 7 CUMB. L. REV. 307, 311 n.28 (1976).
8 In the federal courts and most state courts, the adverse testimony privilege is only
available in criminal cases. The Supreme Court in Hawkins v. United States stated:
The basic reason the law has refused to pit wife against husband or husband
against wife in a trial where life or liberty is at stake was a belief that such a
policy was necessary to foster family peace, not only for the benefit of hus-
band, wife and children, but for the benefit of the public as well.
358 U.S. at 77 (emphasis added); see Ryan v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 531 (7th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 820 (1978) (concluding that Supreme Court in Hawkins
was referring to criminal cases). Proposed Rule of Evidence 505(a), although rejected
by Congress, would have limited the privilege to criminal cases. See United States v.
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mation or communication. 9
By contrast, the confidential communications privilege prevents
disclosure of confidential communications made between spouses
during their marriage.' 0 Although marital communications are
presumptively confidential," the presence of third parties destroys
the confidentiality.' 2 The privilege survives the marriage,' 3 and
either spouse may invoke it.' 4
Although the two privileges sometimes overlap, many instances
are governed by only one. For example, if a spouse is called to tes-
tify about confidential communications which occurred during the
parties' marriage, and the parties are still married at the time of
trial, both privileges apply. If the testimony concerns statements
made in the presence of a third party, however, the confidential
communications privilege does not apply because the communica-
tions are not confidential. Nevertheless, the adverse testimony priv-
ilege would apply because one spouse would be called upon to
testify against the other. On the other hand, if there were a truly
confidential communication between spouses who were subse-
quently divorced, the communication would not be protected by the
Van Drunen, 501 F.2d 1393 (7th Cir.) (application of the privilege where it made the
most sense, namely where a spouse who is neither a victim nor a participant observes
evidence of the other spouse's crime), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1091 (1974); Developments
in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1571 (1985); Hutch-
ins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence: Family Relations, 13 MINN.
L. REV. 675 (1929); see also In re Martenson, 779 F.2d 461, 463 (8th Cir. 1985) (court
declined to decide question whether privilege is limited to criminal cases).
The privilege has generally been found applicable in grand jury proceedings. See In
re Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276, 277-80 (3d Cir. 1980); In re Snoonian, 502 F.2d 110 (1st
Cir. 1974). The applicability of the privilege to administrative tax investigations is an
open question. Rosenblatt, Marital Privileges in Tax Fraud Cases: The Government's
Nonacquiescence in Wedded Bliss, 65 TAXES 10 (1987).
The confidential communications privilege, on the other hand, does apply to some
civil proceedings. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2338, at 666 (applies to civil
actions for family nonsupport).
9 United States v. Lilley, 581 F.2d 182, 189 (8th Cir. 1978).
10 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2335, at 647.
1 Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332, 333 (1951).
12 Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6 (1954); Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7,
14, 16 (1934) (presence of personal stenographer destroys privilege); Hutchins & Sles-
inger, supra note 8, at 681.
13 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2335, at 648; see Merlin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 180
F. Supp. 90, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (after husband's death, wife's testimony regarding con-
versations with husband excluded); Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6 (1954) (dic-
tum) (privilege unaffected by divorce).
14 United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006, 1008 (2d Cir.), aff'd on rehearing, 138
F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 794 (1944); Comment, supra note 7, at
311.
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adverse testimony privilege because at the time of trial the parties
would no longer be married. The communication would, however,
be protected by the confidential communications privilege. 5 A
criminal defendant who marries a witness to prevent testimony
about nonconfidential communications might be covered by the ad-
verse testimony privilege but would not be covered by the confiden-
tial communications privilege.
While a central rationale underlying both privileges is preserva-
tion of the family,' 6 they do have different purposes:
The [adverse testimony] privilege looks forward with reference to
the particular marriage at hand: the privilege is meant to protect
against the impact of the testimony on the marriage. The [confi-
dential communications] privilege in a sense, is broader and more
abstract: it exists to insure [sic] that spouses generally, prior to
any involvement in criminal activity or a trial, feel free to com-
municate their deepest feelings to each other without fear of
eventual exposure in a court of law.17
B. Origins and Development of the Adverse Testimony Privilege
The origins of the adverse testimony privilege are immersed in
"tantalizing obscurity."' 8 There are numerous accounts of how the
privilege came to exist, and different accounts identify different ra-
tionales for the existence of the privilege. The question courts and
legislatures must examine is whether sufficiently compelling policy
grounds have replaced the original rationales.
In Trammel v. United States,'9 the Supreme Court gave one ac-
count of the history of the adverse testimony privilege. The Court
quoted Lord Coke who wrote in 1628 that "it hath beene resolved
by the Justices that a wife cannot be produced either against or for
her husband."'20 According to the Court, the privilege sprang from
two canons of medieval jurisprudence: first, an accused was not
permitted to testify in his own behalf because of his interest in the
15 The distinction between the privileges is also exemplified in a case where one
spouse is called upon to testify about confidential communications which are not ad-
verse to the party-witness. While protected by the confidential communications privi-
lege, the testimony would not be protected by the adverse testimony privilege because it
is not "adverse" to the other spouse. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2334, at 646.
16 United States v. Van Drunen, 501 F.2d 1393, 1396 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1091 (1974).
17 United States v. Byrd, 750 F.2d 585, 590 (7th Cir. 1984).
18 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2227, at 211.
19 445 U.S. 40 (1980).20 1d. at 43-44 (citing I E. COKE, A COMMENTARIE UPON LITTLETON 6b (1628)).
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proceeding; second, husband and wife were regarded as one, and
since the woman had no recognized separate legal existence, the
husband was that one.2" Therefore, if the husband could not testify,
neither could his wife.22
Differing with the Supreme Court, Dean Wigmore suggested that
the adverse testimony privilege arose about the same time as
spousal incompetence, the disqualification of a husband or wife
from testifying for the other.23 Evidence that the adverse testimony
privilege arose prior to spousal incompetence is found in the earliest
reported case endorsing the privilege, Bent v. Allot,24 in 1580. In
that case, a defendant examined his wife as a witness. No question
was raised about the wife's capacity to testify, but the court upheld
the husband's privilege to keep her from testifying against him. 25
By contrast, there was no reported ruling on the disqualification of
a wife due to incompetency for some time thereafter.26
American courts adopted the rule of spousal disqualification, and
the Supreme Court first applied it in an 1839 case.27 By the early
twentieth century, the rule was well established.28 In Funk v.
United States,29 the Supreme Court finally eliminated spousal dis-
qualification in federal courts, permitting a defendant's spouse to
testify on the defendant's behalf ° The rule that one spouse could
prevent the other from giving adverse testimony remained.
21 Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44.
22 The use of the terms "husband" and "wife" are not entirely inappropriate in this
context. A review of hundreds of cases dating from the mid-seventeenth century to the
present has revealed that only a handful of cases have involved husbands testifying
against wives. Whether this will change as women become increasingly involved in
criminal activity is yet to be seen. Lempert, supra note 2, at 727; Developments in the
Law, supra note 8, at 1586-87 & n. 170 (estimate that over 90% of the cases in which
privilege is invoked involve wives testifying against husbands).
23 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2227, at 211.
24 21 Eng. Rep. 50 (Ch. 1580).
25 It is no surprise that courts would immunize a husband from his wife's testimony.
At this time the offense of petit treason existed to protect the head of household from
violence by a wife or servant. Testimony of a wife at trial which caused her husband's
death would effectively violate or at least be inconsistent with the concept of protecting
the husband from his wife. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2227, at 212; Developments
in the Law, supra note 8, at 1565; Comment, supra note 7, at 310.
26 Disqualification was mentioned by Coke in 1628, but there were no rulings on it
until Charles II's reign. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2227, at 211 n.3.
27 Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. 184, 194-97, 13 Pet. 209, 221-23 (1839); see also Graves
v. United States, 150 U.S. 118 (1893); Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254 U.S. 189, 195
(1920).
28 Jin Fuey Moy, 254 U.S. at 195, quoted in Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. at 44.
29 290 U.S. 371 (1933).
30 "[A] refusal to permit the wife upon the ground of interest to testify in behalf of
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By comparison, the privilege protecting confidential communica-
tions between spouses was not recognized until the mid-1800s. 31
Prior to that time, the disqualification of spouses protected against
testimony regarding confidential communications. Only in the rare
case where neither spouse was a party could confidential marital
communications be introduced. After the spousal disqualification
was abolished, the confidential communications privilege began to
emerge.32 Protection of marital harmony was the rationale behind
spousal disqualification,33 and when disqualification fell, the courts
ruled that the same rationale called for a confidential communica-
tions privilege.34
In 1946, Congress enacted Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure, which left the interpretation of privilege to the
courts.3 5 The next major development in privilege law occurred in
1973, when the Supreme Court submitted proposed rules of evi-
dence to Congress.3 6  The proposed rules drew intense criticism,37
her husband, while permitting him, who has the greater interest, to testify for himself,
presents a manifest incongruity." Id. at 381.
31 There is one instance of its application found in 1684. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 2, § 2333, at 644 & n.l (citing Lady Ivy's Trial, 10 How. St. Tr. 555, 628 (1684)
(involved a husband's oath to the wife's request that he commit forgery not admitted
against her as witness)).
32 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2333, at 644-45; Developments in the Law, supra
note 8, at 1565.
33 See Stapleton v. Crofts, 18 Q.B. 367, 118 Eng. Rep. 137 (1852); Comment, supra
note 7, at 308.
34 Williams v. Betts, 11 Del. Ch. 128, 98 A. 371 (1916); Mercer v. State, 40 Fla. 216,
24 So. 154 (1898); McCormick v. State, 135 Tenn. 218, 186 S.W. 95 (1916); Comment,
supra note 7, at 308.
35 FED. R. CRIM. P. 26, as approved in 1946, provided:
The admissibility of evidence and the competency and privileges of witnesses
shall be governed, except when an act of Congress or these rules otherwise
provide, by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by
the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.
36 S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 7051. Proposed Draft Rule 505 governed marital communications. It
provided:
(a) General Rule of Privilege. A person has a privilege to prevent any testi-
mony of his spouse from being admitted in evidence in a criminal proceeding
against him.
(b) Who May Claim the Privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the per-
son or by the spouse on his behalf. The authority of the spouse to do so is
presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
(c) Exceptions. There is no privilege under this rule (1) in proceedings in
which one spouse is charged with a crime against the person or property of the
other or of a child of either, or with a crime against the person or property of a
third person committed in the course of committing a crime against the other,
or (2) as to matters occurring prior to the marriage, or (3) in proceedings in
[Vol. 67, 1988]
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in part because they only provided for an adverse testimony privi-
lege and not a privilege for confidential marital communications.
In response to the uproar over the proposed rules on privilege,
Congress abandoned the approach of specifying the contours of the
various privileges. Instead, Congress enacted Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 501,38 which allows the federal courts to interpret the com-
mon law "in the light of reason and experience, ' ' 39 except in cases
governed by state substantive law in which state law privileges ap-
ply.' ° The Supreme Court, in Trammel, interpreted this develop-
ment of the federal rules of privilege:
In rejecting the proposed Rules and enacting Rule 501, Congress
manifested an affirmative intention not to freeze the law of privi-
lege. Its purpose was to "provide the courts with the flexibility
to develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis," and to leave
which a spouse is charged with importing an alien for prostitution or other
immoral purpose in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1328, or with transporting a female
in interstate commerce for immoral purposes or other offense in violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424.
51 F.R.D. 315, 369 (1971).
37 See, e.g., Black, The Marital and Physician Privileges-A Reprint of a Letter to a
Congressman, 1975 DUKE L.J. 45-52; Krattenmaker, Testimonial Privileges in Federal
Courts: An Alternative to the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEO. L.J. 61, 94-
100 (1973); Reutlinger, Policy, Privacy, and Prerogatives. A Critical Examination of the
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence as They Affect Marital Privilege, 61 CALIF. L. REV.
1353, 1370 (1973).
38 Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or pro-
vided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursu-
ant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government,
State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in
the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings,
with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies
the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.
FED. R. EViD. 501.
39 Even before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, the Supreme
Court asserted in Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. at 381-86, that it had the authority to
repeal or modify the rules of evidence in the federal courts in the absence of applicable
legislation. The Court's rationale was that the common law is not static but adapts
itself to changing circumstances. In abolishing the spousal incompetence rule, the
Court noted that the underlying policy no longer made sense given the changes in soci-
ety. The standard by which the Court evaluated the common law was one of reason and
experience. Funk, 290 U.S. at 381-85; Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7 (1934) (reaf-
firming the authority of the federal courts to interpret common-law evidentiary princi-
ples in the "light of reason and experience"); Note, Federal Marital Privileges in a
Criminal Context. The Need for Further Modification Since Trammel, 43 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 197, 205 (1986).
40 This follows the rule in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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the door open to change. 4'
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the terms and continued
existence of the adverse testimony privilege are in the hands of the
courts of the United States, guided only by "reason and
experience."
II
BROAD EXCEPTIONS TO THE PRIVILEGE
Over its long history, the adverse testimony privilege has not re-
mained absolute. Courts have carved out a number of significant
exceptions allowing valuable testimony where the policies underly-
ing the privilege are not being advanced. These exceptions, which
are generally unworkable, have dramatically reduced the scope of
the privilege.
A. Crimes Against a Spouse
A number of exceptions to the privilege developed at common
law to prevent certain injustices. Crimes against a wife or child
were of particular concern. If the adverse testimony privilege were
strictly applied, it would be difficult to prosecute a husband for do-
mestic crimes of violence. Therefore, in many crimes against a
spouse, including assault and battery, attempted murder, and rape,
the courts have held the adverse testimony privilege inapplicable.42
While some courts have based their decision on necessity,43 others
have concluded that the privilege should not apply in cases of inter-
spousal violence because the interests of promoting marital har-
mony and peace are not served.4
This reasoning has also led to an exception for Mann Act4 5 prose-
cutions where the defendant has prostituted his wife. Because pros-
titution is considered an offense against the wife and the marital
41 Trammel, 445 U.S. at 47-48 (quoting 120 CONG. REC. 40,891 (1974) (statement of
Rep. Hungate)); cf. BANKR. R. 9017 (bankruptcy rules also leave the courts free to
resolve the scope and applicability of privilege).
42 Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. 209, 221 (1839) (rule that spouses are incompetent as
witnesses is not applicable to husband's offenses against wife); C. MCCORMICK, MC-
CORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 66, at 162 (3d ed. 1984); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2,
§ 2239, at 243-47.
43 See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 46 n.7; Lord Audley's Case, 123 Eng. Rep. 1140 (1631);
8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2239.
44 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2239, at 243.
45 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1982) (knowingly transporting a woman in interstate commerce
for the purpose of prostitution).
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relationship, the privilege has been held inapplicable.46 Other ex-
ceptions in the federal courts include crimes against the spouse's
property47 and crimes against the children of either spouse.48
B. Marriages Not Worth Protecting
One of the policy grounds supporting the adverse testimony privi-
lege is preservation of marital harmony. That policy is not served
where marital relations are already poor or nonexistent. As a re-
sult, many courts have admitted adverse testimony over a claim of
privilege where it appears that marital harmony does not need
protection.
1. Limiting the Adverse Testimony Privilege to the
Witness-Spouse
A question which arises with any privilege is who may invoke it.
State courts and legislatures have responded in a variety of ways to
the question of whether the witness-spouse and/or the party-spouse
may invoke the adverse testimony privilege.49 The Supreme Court
first addressed the question in Hawkins v. United States,5" a Mann
Act prosecution in which the district court and court of appeals
found no error in allowing the government, over the defendant's
objections, to use the defendant's wife as a witness against him. On
appeal to the Supreme Court, the government argued that while a
husband or wife should not be compelled to testify against the
46 Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525, 529-31 (1960). Contra id. at 534 (Warren,
C.J., dissenting) (wife's refusal to testify demonstrates there is still a marital relationship
to be protected).
47 Herman v. United States, 220 F.2d 219, 226 (4th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
971 (1956); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2239, at 252-53.
48 United States v. Cameron, 556 F.2d 752, 755 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Allery, 526 F.2d 1362, 1367 (8th Cir. 1975) (privilege inapplicable to testimony by de-
fendant's wife where defendant charged with attempting to rape his twelve-year-old
daughter); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2239, at 248 (on the theory that an injury to a
spouse's child is a wrong to the spouse).
49 Some states allow a party to prevent his or her spouse from giving adverse testi-
mony. While the majority of these states grant the privilege only to the party-spouse,
some allow the witness-spouse to testify even if the party-spouse waives the privilege.
Developments in the Law, supra note 8, at 1567. In other states, the witness-spouse may
refuse to give adverse testimony, but the party-spouse may not prevent voluntary testi-
mony by the witness-spouse. Id. Finally, some states avoid the question of who may
raise the privilege by simply rendering a spouse incompetent to testify against his or her
marital partner. Note, Circling the Wagons. Informational Privacy and Family Testi-
monial Privileges, 20 GA. L. REV. 173, 181 n.26 (1985).
50 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
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other, they should be free to do so voluntarily.51 The Court rejected
that argument on the grounds that the privilege is designed to foster
family peace for the benefit of the spouses, their children, and the
public.52 The Court reasoned that adverse testimony, whether vol-
untary or compelled, will almost certainly disturb that harmony.53
The government argued that voluntary adverse testimony may be
proof that a particular marital relationship is not worth preserv-
ing. 54 The Court rejected the argument, noting that even if
problems with the marriage led one spouse to testify voluntarily,
not all marital difficulties are irreparable. The Court reasoned that
adverse testimony would cause lasting harm to any chance of recon-
ciliation between spouses. 5
In Trammel v. United States,56 the Supreme Court's most recent
decision concerning the adverse testimony privilege, the Court mod-
ified its holding in Hawkins and held that only the witness-spouse
can invoke the adverse testimony privilege. 57 The case involved
prosecution of Otis Trammel and others for conspiracy to import
heroin. Trammel's wife, who had acted as a courier, was named as
an unindicted co-conspirator. She agreed to testify against her hus-
band based on the assurance she would receive lenient treatment.
Mr. Trammel attempted to assert the adverse testimony privilege to
prevent her testimony.
The Court concluded that the policy supporting the privilege, en-
couraging marital harmony, was not served by allowing the defen-
dant-spouse to prevent voluntary testimony by the witness-spouse.58
Repudiating its earlier reasoning, the Court adopted the govern-
ment's position in Hawkins, and concluded that there is little left to
protect in a marital relationship after one spouse agrees to volunta-
rily testify against the other.5 9
There has been considerable criticism of the Court's unquestion-
ing acceptance of the voluntariness of a witness-spouse's testi-
mony.' There are a number of ways in which the government can
51 Id. at 77.
52 Id.
53Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 77-78.
56 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
57 Id. at 53.
58 Id. at 52-53.
59 Id. at 62.
60 See, e.g., Lempert, supra note 2, at 733-38; Developments in the Law, supra note 8,
at 1568 & n.41.
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induce a witness-spouse to "voluntarily" testify. In Hawkins, the
witness-spouse was imprisoned as a material witness and released
only after posting a substantial bond conditioned upon her appear-
ing in court as a witness for the government. In Trammel, it is not
clear that the wife's testimony was truly voluntary since in return
for her testimony she was granted immunity from prosecution as a
co-conspirator.
Commentators have argued that the government should not be
allowed to turn one spouse against the other by striking a deal for
the witness-spouse's testimony. 61 In Hawkins, Chief Justice War-
ren, a former prosecutor, considered various ways in which the
prosecution can secure apparently voluntary testimony from an un-
willing witness.62 In Trammel, Chief Justice Burger responded
that, even with the privilege, the government can enlist the aid of
one spouse against the other outside the courtroom, producing the
same interference in the marital relationship.63
2. Exceptions Based on the Status of the Marriage
Courts have examined the nature of the particular marriage at
hand to determine whether the adverse testimony privilege should
be available. Generally, the privilege applies only if the party and
witness are married at the time the testimony is given.6 The mar-
riage requirement restricts application of the privilege in the same
fashion as an exception would. For instance, the privilege has been
held inapplicable where the party and spouse were permanently sep-
61 Lempert, supra note 2, at 735-38; Developments in the Law, supra note 8, at 1568 &
n.41 (proposing that the party-spouse be entitled to prove that the testimony is not
being given voluntarily). However, in states that have vested the privilege in the wit-
ness-spouse, there is little indication that coercion has taken place. Lempert, supra note
2, at 737.
62 Lempert, supra note 2, at 733.
63 Trammel, 445 U.S. at 52 & n.12.
64 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2230, at 223; see C. MCCORMICK, supra note 42,
§ 66, at 162. A natural corollary is that the privilege is inapplicable after a divorce, see,
e.g., United States v. Smith, 533 F.2d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Ter-
mini, 267 F.2d 18, 19-20 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 822 (1959), or death of one
spouse, 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2237, at 239-40; see also United States v. Lustig,
555 F.2d 737, 747-48 (9th Cir.) (no privilege for couple living together but not legally
married, where common-law marriages not valid in Alaska), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 926
(1977) and 434 U.S. 1045 (1978); United States v. White, 545 F.2d 1129, 1130 (8th Cir.
1976) (privilege not available to defendant and alleged common-law wife, where state
did not recognize common-law marriages); State v. Watkins, 126 Ariz. 293, 298, 614
P.2d 835, 840 (1980) (no privilege where couple living together in a "de facto"
marriage).
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arated at the time of trial.65 Similar logic has led to rejection of the
privilege where the marriage was entered into fraudulently 66 or
where the marriage is beyond preservation.67 Legislatures and
courts have consistently refused to grant the privilege to unmarried
couples, regardless of the "marital" characteristics of their relation-
ship.68 On the other hand, in an unusual twist, one court concluded
that a witness-spouse and party-spouse who had been married for
forty years had such a strong relationship that adverse testimony
would not significantly affect the marriage.69
3. Exceptions for Prior Acts, Hearsay, and Immunity
Although inconsistent with protecting the ongoing marital rela-
tionship, the privilege has been found inapplicable where the wit-
ness-spouse's testimony concerns acts occurring before the
marriage. 71 Courts applying this exception reason that it is neces-
sary to avoid promoting collusive marriages. 7' This exception ap-
plies to all marriages, not just to those in which there is evidence of
collusion, to avoid minitrials on the parties' sincerity in getting
married.72
65 United States v. Fulk, 816 F.2d 1202, 1205 (7th Cir. 1987). But cf. Jackson v.
United States, 250 F.2d 897, 899-900 (5th Cir. 1958) (privilege applied even though
spouses had been separated).
66 United States v. Mathis, 559 F.2d 294, 298 (5th Cir. 1977) (remarriage of ex-wife
less than two months prior to trial based on promise of money and conceding custody of
their child); United States v. Apodaca, 522 F.2d 568, 571 (10th Cir. 1975) (marriage
three days before trial).
67 United States v. Fisher, 518 F.2d 836, 840 (2d Cir.) (parties had not cohabited for
eleven years; husband lives with and had two children by another woman; wife's appeal
from divorce decree pending), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1033 (1975).
68 Developments in the Law, supra note 8, at 1566 & n.23.
69 Ryan v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 531, 543-45 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
820 (1978).
70 United States v. Clark, 712 F.2d 299, 302 (7th Cir. 1983) (in order to avoid inquiry
into whether marriage is a sham, privilege does not cover premarital acts and events).
But see United States v. Owens, 424 F. Supp. 421, 423 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) (refusing to
accept this rationale as the basis for an exception to the privilege). Other courts have
concluded that so long as the marriage exists at the time the testimony is to be given, the
events with which the testimony is concerned may have taken place before or during the
marriage. Developments in the Law, supra note 8, at 1567; see State v. Williams, 133
Ariz. 220, 231-32, 650 P.2d 1202, 1213-14 (1982); Brinig & Schwartzstein, Spousal Priv-
ileges, in TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES 332, 336 (S. Stone & R. Liebman eds. 1983); Com-
ment, The Deconstruction of the Marital Privilege, 12 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 723, 762-63
(1985).
71 United States v. Clark, 712 F.2d at 302; United States v. Van Drunen, 501 F.2d
1393, 1397 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1091 (1974).
72 United States v. Clark, 712 F.2d at 302. Contra United States v. Apodaca, 522
F.2d at 568, 570 (10th Cir. 1975) (dictum).
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In addition, marital harmony has not been a significant concern
to courts considering whether to admit hearsay statements by
spouses. Despite the possible repugnance of a spouse's out-of-court
statements serving as the basis for convicting a spouse, and the po-
tential harm to marital harmony, courts have consistently admitted
such statements over claims of privilege.7" These courts reason that
because out-of-court statements have already been made at the time
of trial, "[m]arital harmony would be enhanced minimally if at all
... by excluding the statement when offered after the fact through a
third-party witness at trial, and 'the normally predominant princi-
ple of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth' would be
S.. frustrated."74
A spouse's out-of-court statements can also be used to impeach
the defendant.75 Thus, ironically, despite the policy behind the ad-
verse testimony privilege, a spouse's out-of-court statement which
incriminates a defendant-spouse is not so repugnant as to prevent its
admission.76
The privilege has been found inapplicable where the government
has immunized both spouses against use of the testimony.77 Courts
seem to ignore the possibility that the act of testifying in court may
cause harm to the marital relationship even if the spouse cannot be
convicted on the basis of the adverse testimony. The witness-spouse
has nonetheless publicly revealed damaging evidence, which may
place the defendant-spouse in a bad light or incriminate friends.
4. The Difficulty of Determining Whether a Marriage
is Worth Protecting
In an effort to serve the policy interest of preserving marital har-
mony, some courts have tried to determine whether particular mar-
73 See United States v. Archer, 733 F.2d 354, 358-59 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
861 and 469 U.S. 862 (1984); see also United States v. Lefkowitz, 618 F.2d 1313, 1318
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980); United States v. Tsinnijinnie, 601 F.2d
1035, 1037-39 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 966 (1980); United States v. Mack-
iewicz, 401 F.2d 219, 225 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 923 (1968).
74 United States v. Archer, 733 F.2d at 359 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445
U.S. 40, 50 (1980)).
75 See United States v. Neal, 743 F.2d 1441, 1448 (10th Cir. 1984) (Logan, J., concur-
ring), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1086 (1985); cf Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226
(1971) (statements taken in violation of Miranda admissible for impeachment if defen-
dant testifies).
76 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Koecher, 601 F. Supp. 385, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
77See In re Grand Jury Matter, 673 F.2d 688, 694 n.12 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1015 (1982); United States v. Doe, 478 F.2d 194, 195 (1st Cir. 1973).
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riages are moribund, damaged beyond repair, or otherwise not
worthy of protection. In such cases, spouses are not permitted to
invoke the adverse testimony privilege because there is ostensibly no
marital harmony left to preserve.7" Unfortunately, for many rea-
sons, courts are not well suited to make judgments during the
course of criminal proceedings about the stability and quality of
marital relationships.
One reason is that courts lack expertise to determine whether re-
lations between spouses have so deteriorated that the marriage no
longer merits protection.79 Any attempt to develop this expertise
and to gather the information necessary to make such a determina-
tion would be unduly time-consuming. Assessing whether mar-
riages merit protection would force courts to hold minitrials during
criminal cases to determine the viability of marriages. Therefore,
criminal proceedings are not appropriate forums for evaluating the
condition of particular marriages.8 0 In light of the wide range of
marital relations, the difficult task of determining which marriages
merit protection, if handled by any court, is better handled by fam-
ily courts,"1 which do not exist in the federal system.
The Second Circuit, in a pre-Trammel decision, cautioned
against making case-by-case determinations of whether a marriage
deserves protection:
[It is neither] practicable [nor] desirable to make the decision de-
pendent upon the judge's conclusion that in the instance before
78 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 605 F.2d 389, 396 (8th Cir.) (husband left wife
after two weeks of marriage), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); United States v. Cam-
eron, 556 F.2d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 1977) (marriage effectively, though not legally, had
expired). Some commentators have encouraged courts to conduct a detailed examina-
tion of the particular marital relation between the witness-spouse and the party-spouse
as a way of limiting the application of the privilege to cases in which marital harmony
will be served. See Rothstein, A Re-Evaluation of the Privilege Against Adverse Spousal
Testimony in the Light of its Purpose, 12 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1189, 1194 (1963); Note,
supra note 39, at 220.
79 Cf. United States v. Byrd, 750 F.2d 585, 592 (7th Cir. 1984). In the context of the
confidential communications privilege, the court concluded that "the making of the de-
terminations of when a marriage has deteriorated to the point when its communications
are no longer confidential would involve courts in difficult factual inquiries in which we
are reluctant to require trial courts to become involved." Id.
80 United States v. Sims, 755 F.2d 1239, 1243 n.3 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 473 U.S.
907 (1985); In re Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276, 279 (3d Cir. 1980) ("[G]iven the theoretical
and empirical difficulties of assessing the social utility of such marriages, either in gen-
eral or in each case, we do not think that courts should 'condition the privilege ... on a
judicial determination that the marriage is a happy or successful one.' ") (quoting
United States v. Lilley, 581 F.2d 182, 189 (8th Cir. 1978)).
81 United States v. Witness Before Grand Jury, 791 F.2d 234, 238 n.2 (2d Cir. 1986).
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him the marriage has already been so far wrecked that there is
nothing to save .... The question will always arise in the pro-
gress of the trial; it must be decided at once; and its answer will
introduce a collateral inquiry likely to complicate the trial
seriously.82
Courts have been unwilling to fashion applicable rules or criteria,
leaving the issue of the viability of the marriage to individual judges
with little guidance or standard of review.83 This lack of standards
creates the danger that judges' individual prejudices regarding how
spouses should relate to each other will serve as the basis for deci-
sions. One alternative is simply to disallow the privilege if the
couple is divorced or legally separated. 4 However, spouses who are
legally separated are technically married and presumably have a
chance to reconcile their marriage.
Because of the difficulty of determining a marriage's viability,
some courts have chosen to apply the privilege whenever the
spouses are married, regardless of the state of the marriage.85 Such
a broad application prohibits valuable testimony from being admit-
ted when no actual harm would have resulted due to the poor con-
dition of the marriage. Ironically, these same courts would not
apply the privilege in a case where a couple was merely engaged to
be married, despite the fact that adverse testimony might cause sig-
nificant harm to the relationship.
Difficulty also arises in determining whether a marriage is a
sham, entered into solely for the purpose of exercising the privilege.
If the marriage occurs after the relevant events but before or during
trial, courts have focused on whether the marriage was based on
legitimate, prior relations between the parties rather than on the
timing of the marriage.86 If the court determines the parties may
82 United States v. Walker, 176 F.2d 564, 568 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 891
(1949).
83 See, e.g., United States v. Cameron, 556 F.2d at 756 ("We fashion no broad rule
with our holding today as to when the marital privilege should be allowed.")
84See United States v. Witness Before Grand Jury, 791 F.2d at 241 (Oakes, J., con-
curring) (otherwise "too amorphous a task to determine the degree of viability of a
marriage"); United States v. Byrd, 750 F.2d at 592 (deterioration of marriage irrelevant
unless spouses permanently separated); United States v. Walker, 176 F.2d at 568 (issue
of the status of the marriage "must be decided at once; and its answer will introduce a
collateral inquiry likely to complicate the trial seriously").
85 See, e.g., United States v. Lilley, 581 F.2d at 182.
86 Compare United States v. Apodaca, 522 F.2d 568, 571 (10th Cir. 1975) (privilege
not upheld where marriage occurred three days before trial and there was evidence
marriage was a result of coercion) with Emo v. United States, 777 F.2d 508, 508-09 (9th
Cir. 1985) (privilege upheld, despite marriage which occurred between service of sub-
poena and scheduled grand jury testimony, based on prior relationship between the
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have married anyway, based on the length and nature of their rela-
tionship, a claim of privilege will be upheld. Even assuming the
court has the requisite expertise for such a determination, the deci-
sion necessitates a time-consuming minitrial.
Courts have also considered the rehabilitative worth of a mar-
riage in determining whether the privilege ought to apply. In
United States v. Van Drunen,s7 the Seventh Circuit refused to allow
the privilege where the defendant was indicted for knowingly trans-
porting an alien into the United States. The defendant subsequently
married the alien, but the court found the marriage to be "collu-
sive" and lacking in the rehabilitative aspects that worthwhile mar-
riages possess."' In In re Grand Jury Subpoena United States, 9 the
Second Circuit criticized the Seventh Circuit's approach because
the rehabilitative effect of a marriage was not a facet of the tradi-
tional common-law justification for the adverse testimony
privilege. 9°
On its face, the privilege is overinclusive in protecting marriages
which have effectively ended or are in such disrepair that adverse
testimony will not harm them. At the same time, courts are ill-
equipped to draw lines between healthy and troubled marriages. It
is, therefore, no solution to suggest that the privilege only cover
marriages deserving of protection.
C. Joint Participant Exception
Recently, considerable debate has arisen over the "joint partici-
pant" exception to the adverse testimony privilege. 9' Where both
parties). Cf. Courtney v. United States, 390 F.2d 521 (9th Cir.) (privilege recognized
where marriage occurred between first and second day of trial), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
857 (1968); San Fratello v. United States, 340 F.2d 560, 566 (fact that defendant mar-
ried witness short time before trial does not prevent invocation of the privilege), reh'g
denied, 343 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1965).
87 501 F.2d 1393 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1091 (1974).
8 8 1d. at 1397.
89 755 F.2d 1022 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 474 U.S. 815 (1985), vacated as moot, 475
U.S. 133 (1986).
901d. at 1026. For a view supporting consideration of the rehabilitative aspect of
marriage, see Note, supra note 39, at 213.
91 See Note, Partners in Crime: The Joint Participant Exception to the Privilege
Against Adverse Spousal Testimony, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1019 (1985) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Partners in Crime]; Note, The Joint Participation Exception to the Marital
Testimony Privilege: Balancing the Interests "In Light of Reason and Experience", 19
IND. L. REV. 645 (1986) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Joint Participation Exception];
Note, Partners in Crime: An Examination of the Privilege Against Adverse Spousal Testi-
mony, 22 J. FAM. L. 713 (1983-84) [hereinafter cited as Note, An Examination of the
Privilege]; Note, supra note 39, at 199-200.
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spouses have participated in the crime ("partners in crime ),92 it
has been argued that the adverse testimony privilege should not be
available. 93 The circuits have split on this question, with the Sev-
enth and Tenth Circuits endorsing the exception 94 and the Second
and Third rejecting it.9'
The Supreme Court was confronted with this exception in Tram-
mel, yet it chose not to address the issue.96 Courts and commenta-
tors speculated on whether the Court implicitly rejected the
exception 97 or simply left the question open.98 Some commentators
have suggested that the exception apply to the involuntary witness-
spouse only when the court determines the marriage is not worth
preserving. 99
92 United States v. Pugliese, 153 F.2d 497, 500 (2d Cir. 1945) ("partnership in
crime").
93 Of course, after Trammel, this exception would arise only when the jointly partici-
pating witness-spouse refused to testify based on the adverse testimony privilege.
94 See, e.g., United States v. Keck, 773 F.2d 759, 767 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Clark, 712 F.2d 299, 300-01 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Trammel, 583 F.2d 1166,
1169-70 (10th Cir. 1978), aff'd on other grounds, 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
95 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena United States, 755 F.2d 1022, 1026-28 (2d
Cir.), cert. granted, 474 U.S. 815 (1985), vacated as moot, 475 U.S. 133 (1986); United
States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 258 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 936 (1983); In re
Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276, 278-79 (3d Cir. 1980).
There has been more widespread agreement that the joint participant exception is
applicable to the confidential communications privilege. See, e.g., United States v. Sims,
755 F.2d 1239, 1243 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 907 (1985); United States v.
Broome, 732 F.2d 363, 364-65 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 855 (1984); United
States v. Entrekin, 624 F.2d 597, 598 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981);
United States v. Van Drunen, 501 F.2d 1393, 1396 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1091 (1974).96 See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980). The Supreme Court had
another opportunity to recognize a joint participant exception in In re Grand Jury Mat-
ter, 673 F.2d 688 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1015 (1982). Once again it declined.
The issue arose yet again before the Supreme Court in United States v. Koecher, 474
U.S. 815, appealed from 755 F.2d 1022 (2d Cir. 1985), vacated as moot, 475 U.S. 133
(1986), but the case became moot before it could be decided.
97 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena United States, 755 F.2d at 1026 (Trammel has
"some negative implications" concerning joint participant exception); Note, Partners in
Crime, supra note 91, at 1027-32; Note, An Examination of the Privilege, supra note 91.
98 See United States v. Clark, 712 F.2d at 301 n.l (Trammel did not consider joint
participant exception, and its criticism of the adverse testimony privilege makes it un-
likely it was implicitly rejecting an exception to the privilege); cf In re Malfitano, 633
F.2d at 279 (no exception will encourage government to charge both spouses in hopes
that one will incriminate the other to exculpate him or herself; irony that allegation will
be easier to prove the closer the marriage).
99 See, e.g., Note, supra note 39, at 220. The author suggests that courts, in order to
avoid collusive marriages, should consider when the spouses were married, whether the
spouses cohabitated for an insubstantial time since the marriage, whether the spouses
have lived with someone else since the marriage, and whether one spouse has threatened
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If it is accepted that the adverse testimony privilege balances the
benefit of protecting marital harmony and the cost of losing valua-
ble evidence at trial, the privilege should fail where both spouses are
involved in the criminal activity. By their nature, conspiracies are
difficult to prove. Therefore, the law compensates by easing the
proof burden required to show participation in a conspiracy I°° and
allowing statements of one conspirator to be used against an-
other.'0 ' Application of the privilege may serve to silence the best,
and perhaps only, witness to the crime,'I 2 providing an extensive
shield to criminal activity.103
A less forceful argument in favor of the exception is that mar-
riages in which the spouses are jointly participating in crime are
unstable and likely to disintegrate because of the joint participation.
The argument suggests that such marriages are beyond hope and
therefore not in need of protection. However, there is no empirical
evidence which indicates that marital partners in crime are not hap-
pily married."° Also, the fact that only the witness-spouse can in-
voke the privilege serves as a check. Presumably, if the marriage is
in trouble, the witness-spouse will not invoke the privilege. !0 5
An additional argument in favor of the joint participant excep-
the other spouse not to testify. Id. Finding one or more of these circumstances to exist,
the court should compel involuntary spousal testimony. Id; see also Note, The Joint
Participation Exception, supra note 91, at 662-63, in which the author suggests that, in
evaluating whether to overcome the privilege, the court should initially determine
whether the marriage is worth protecting and, if so, should consider the nature and
magnitude of the crime involved, whether the testimony is expected to be material, and
whether the same information could be obtained from another source. Lastly, the court
should consider the extent of harm to the marriage if the spouse were ordered to testify.
Id. For a discussion of the difficulties associated with judicial determination of whether
the marriage is worth protecting, see supra PART II.B.4.
100 See, e.g., United States v. Enstam, 622 F.2d 857, 867 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 912 and 451 U.S. 907 (1981).
101 See, e.g., Bourjaily v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2775, 2781 (1987).
102 Of course, after Trammel, criminal defendants may not be sure their spouses will
not voluntarily choose to testify against them. In re Grand Jury Subpoena United
States, 755 F.2d at 1026.
103 Bentham noted this danger:
Let us, therefore, grant to every man a license to commit all sorts of wicked-
ness, in the presence and with the assistance of his wife: let us secure to every
man in the bosom of his family, and in his own bosom, a safe accomplice: let
us make every man's house his castle; and, as far as depends upon us, let us
convert that castle into a den of thieves.
J. BENTHAM, 5 RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 340 (1827) (footnote omitted).
104 In re Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276, 278 (3d Cir. 1980) (nothing in the record or other-
wise to indicate that marriages with criminal overtones disintegrate and dissolve).
105 See id.
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tion is that a marriage used merely as a cover for criminal activity
does not deserve protection. However, proponents of this argument
cannot point to any public policy against marital partners in crime
remaining married.Io In addition, it is inappropriate for the rules
of evidence to be the source of punishment above the penalties pro-
scribed by criminal law.'" 7
Another argument is that any rehabilitative effect of the marriage
on criminals is diminished where both spouses are joint participants
in crime. ' 8 This position has been criticized on the ground that the
common-law rationale for the adverse testimony privilege never in-
cluded marriage's rehabilitative effect" and that marriage may in
fact restrain future antisocial acts."° As in conspiracy proceedings,
the strongest and most convincing argument in favor of the joint
participant exception is the difficulty of obtaining evidence rather
than any argument based on social judgments about marriages be-
tween criminals.
Determining whether both spouses are joint participants for pur-
poses of the joint participant exception is difficult to establish with-
out invading the privilege. "' To determine whether both spouses
were involved in criminal activity, the prosecution may have to
elicit testimony from each spouse regarding the other's activities.
Forcing this testimony results in the harm the privilege was
designed to prevent: the disruption in the marital relationship
which occurs when one spouse testifies against the other. To avoid
this dilemma, courts could require independent evidence of joint
participation before finding the exception applicable, thus avoiding
a disruptive effect on the marriage.
1I61d.
1Id.
108 United States v. Van Drunen, 501 F.2d 1393, 1396-97 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1091 (1974). However, the Second Circuit, in In Re Grand Jury Subpoena United
States, 755 F.2d at 1025 n.5, noted that the witness-spouse in Van Drunen apparently
testified voluntarily. If the case had been decided after Trammel, there would have been
no need to invoke the joint participation exception because of the Supreme Court's
holding in Trammel that only the witness-spouse can claim the privilege. This attack
does not go to the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit. The Second Circuit observed that
an alternative ground to the holding in Van Drunen was that the testimony concerned
events which occurred prior to the marriage. Id.
It could likewise be said that the Seventh Circuit's holding in United States v. Keck,
773 F.2d 759 (7th Cir. 1985), was dicta because the extrajudicial statements involved
were not subject to the privilege regardless of the joint participant exception.
109 In re Grand Jury Subpoena United States, 755 F.2d at 1026.
110 In re Malfitano, 633 F.2d at 278.
111 In re Grand Jury Subpoena United States, 755 F.2d at 1028.
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Codefendant spouses have argued that severance should be
granted so that each could take the stand in their own trials to pres-
ent exculpatory evidence, but invoke the adverse testimony privilege
in their spouse's trial to avoid providing damaging testimony.' 1 2
Surely, it would be a farce to, on one hand, allow each spouse to
divert criminal liability to the other through their own testimony,
and on the other hand, protect the other spouse from that negative
testimony by invoking the privilege. '13 To do so would confirm Jer-
emy Bentham's concern that the adverse testimony privilege fosters,
and perhaps creates, partners in crime." 4
D. Testimony Not Adverse
Inherent in its name, the adverse testimony privilege can be inter-
preted as applying only to testimony by one spouse which is adverse
to the other spouse's legal interests." 5 It appears from the large
number of reported decisions dealing with the issue that courts have
given real meaning to the adversity requirement. In some instances,
this is based on the general policy of construing privileges nar-
rowly.' 6 In other cases, it is possible to infer that courts are un-
sympathetic to the adverse testimony privilege and construe it to
112 If there are multiple defendants, the government may be forced to grant immunity
for use of the witness-spouse's testimony against the party-spouse. In re Grand Jury
Proceedings of Larson, 785 F.2d 629 (8th Cir. 1986) (dictum); In re Grand Jury Sub-
poena of Ford, 756 F.2d 249, 253-54 (2d Cir. 1985); In re Grand Jury Matter, 673 F.2d
688, 692-94 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1015 (1982) (witness can assert privilege
where promise of immunity withdrawn); In re Snoonian, 502 F.2d 110, 112-13 (5th Cir.
1974).
The government, in an extreme case, felt a need to assign separate prosecutors so that
the one who heard the witness-spouse's testimony against others was not involved in the
prosecution of the party-spouse. The Second Circuit upheld this procedure. In re
Grand Jury Subpoena of Ford, 756 F.2d 249 (2d Cir. 1985); see also In re Grand Jury
Subpoenas of Clay and Wareham, 603 F. Supp. 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
113 This very possibility arose in a case where a court suggested that severance might
have been appropriate if each spouse could have offered favorable testimony for the
other. United States v. Vaccaro, 816 F.2d 443, 450 (9th Cir.) (failure to sever not preju-
dicial where no showing that invocation of marital privilege would have prevented mar-
ried codefendants from effectively defending themselves), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 262
(1987). The court analogized to cases in which a codefendant invoked the fifth amend-
ment privilege not to testify and the necessity of showing the harm resulting from the
failure to obtain that testimony. The application of the joint participant exception
would be appropriate in this case to prevent this possible injustice. Id. (citing United
States v. Little, 753 F.2d 1420, 1446 (9th Cir. 1984)).
114 J. BENTHAM, supra note 103.
"15 United States v. Van Cauwenberghe, 814 F.2d 1329, 1337 (9th Cir. 1987) (not a
blanket privilege, only available where testimony would be adverse), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 773 (1988); Developments in the Law, supra note 8, at 1569.
116 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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restrict its application. As a result, the adversity requirement re-
stricts application of the privilege in the same fashion as do excep-
tions to the privilege.
1. Substantive Versus Contextual Adversity
The privilege clearly covers testimony by a witness-spouse which
is substantively harmful to the party-spouse's position. It might
make sense, given the goal of protecting marital relationships, to
conclude that any testimony by a spouse which the prosecutor
chooses to elicit in establishing a case against a party-spouse ought
to be protected as well. 117 Courts have rejected this contextual ad-
versity standard in favor of one of both contextual and substantive
adversity, where the in-court testimony is actually adverse to the
party's interests. 1 ' Following this standard, courts have concluded
that testimony regarding neutral, objective facts is unprotected,' 19
and statements of a spouse made outside the courtroom are not sub-
ject to the privilege when offered for impeachment 2 ' because they
117 Party admissions are not hearsay, whether or not they are adverse to the party's
legal interests. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2); see United States v. Clark, 712 F.2d 299, 303
(7th Cir. 1983) (court, in dictum, noted that it was not sure even exculpatory informa-
tion used by prosecution would not be a threat to marital harmony).
118 United States v. Smith, 742 F.2d 398, 401 (8th Cir. 1984).
119 United States v. Brown, 605 F.2d 389, 396 (8th Cir.) (check cashing scheme: tes-
timony by spouse relating to otherwise legal origins of scheme and fact that signature on
forged checks was not hers held not adverse), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Develop-
ments in the Law, supra note 8, at 1569; see also In re Martenson, 779 F.2d 461, 464
(8th Cir. 1986) (questions directed at objective facts; speculative harm to spouse's pecu-
niary interest but no discernible impact on penal interests sufficient to invoke privilege);
United States v. Smith, 742 F.2d at 401; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 664 F.2d 423,
430 (5th Cir. 1981) (witness-spouse answered objective questions containing no refer-
ence to her husband), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982).
120 See United States v. Neal, 743 F.2d 1441, 1448 (10th Cir. 1984) (Logan, J., con-
curring), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1086 (1985); cf Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222
(1971) (statements inadmissible in prosecution's case due to Miranda violations admissi-
ble for impeachment purposes).
Out-of-court statements, even when offered substantively, have been allowed. See
United States v. Archer, 733 F.2d 354, 358-59 (5th Cir.) (neither defendant nor spouse
may exclude out-of-court statements), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 861 and 469 U.S. 862
(1984), abandoning United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 894, 897-98 (5th Cir. 1971)
(party-spouse may not be asked about wife's out-of-court statements); see also United
States v. Tsinnijinnie, 601 F.2d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 966
(1980) (spouse's out-of-court excited utterance admitted); United States v. Mackiewicz,
401 F.2d 219, 225-26 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 923 (1968); Ivey v. United States,
344 F.2d 770, 772 (5th Cir. 1965); United States v. Pugliese, 153 F.2d 497, 500 (2d Cir.
1945). Likewise, a spouse may not invoke the privilege to prevent production of out-of-
court handwriting exemplars and fingerprints. United States v. Scott, 784 F.2d 787, 793
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1145 (1986).
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lack contextual adversity.
Appellate courts also use the adversity requirement to reject
claims that privileged testimony was improperly admitted at trial.
In a recent case where the trial court had allowed the witness-
spouse to testify under circumstances suggesting involuntary testi-
mony, in violation of the Trammel requirement, the court of ap-
peals found no reversible error. It held that the testimony was not
adverse to the party-spouse's interests and thus the privilege was
inapplicable. 1
2. A Broad Reading of Adversity
In two instances, courts have taken an expansive position on
what constitutes adversity, extending the privilege to situations
where most courts would find an exception to the privilege.' 22
These examples do not follow the contextual versus substantive dis-
tinction. The first case concerned testimony by a spouse in a pro-
ceeding in which the other spouse was not a party. The court held
that a wife's testimony was adverse and therefore privileged if it
could implicate a third party who, in turn, could implicate the hus-
band. '23 This expansive view of adversity presents a danger that
valuable testimony against third parties will be lost on the mere
contingency that those third parties will implicate the witness'
spouse. Since the threat to marital harmony is tenuous, and the
threat to the information-gathering process is substantial, the privi-
lege is inappropriate. The absence of direct confrontation between
spouses reduces the likelihood of negative consequences to the
marriage.
In the second case where a court applied an expansive interpreta-
tion of adversity, a wife's testimony favorable to codefendants ar-
guably created a negative inference that her husband was guilty
because she provided no exculpatory testimony for him. Although
the harm was speculative, the court granted a severance resulting in
inefficient prosecution of the case.' 2 4
121 See United States v. Smith, 742 F.2d at 401.
122 In re Grand Jury Matter, 673 F.2d 688 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1015
(1982); United States v. Fields, 458 F.2d 1194, 1199 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 927 (1973).
123 In re Grand Jury Matter, 673 F.2d at 692; see also United States v. Doe, 478 F.2d
194, 195 (1st Cir. 1973); Comment, supra note 70, at 754-56. One method of protecting
a spouse from third-party implication is to immunize the spouse against the govern-
ment's use of the testimony.
124 See United States v. Fields, 458 F.2d at 1199.
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III
LEGAL AND POLICY RATIONALES FOR THE PRIVILEGE
The adverse testimony privilege remains largely due to inertia. 125
125 The Supreme Court's mandate under Federal Rule of Evidence 501 is to interpret
the common-law privileges in light of "reason and experience." In addition to federal
court decisions, the actions of state courts and legislatures provide relevant "experi-
ence" upon which to base changes in the adverse testimony privilege. The Trammel
Court noted that actions by the states had special relevance to this marital privilege
because laws relating to marriage and domestic relations are traditionally state con-
cerns. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1980). Actions by the states with
regard to interspousal immunity are also illustrative. The adverse testimony privilege
and interspousal immunity share a common origin, the legal concept of the unity of
husband and wife. The abandonment of that concept has led to a growing rejection of
interspousal immunity. The policy behind interspousal immunity, preserving marital
harmony, has been found to be poorly served by immunizing spouses from tort actions
against each other. As a result, a number of states have completely abrogated their
interspousal immunity doctrines. See, e.g., Flagg v. Loy, 241 Kan. 216, 224-25, 734
P.2d 1183, 1189-90 (1987); Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d 316, 319 (Tex. 1987).
In Trammel, the Supreme Court examined the actions of state legislatures, advisory
committees, and even the English judicial system in reconsidering the adverse testimony
privilege. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. at 44-45. After noting an unmistakable
trend in the states and in England to restrict or abolish the privilege, the Court decided
nonetheless to retain it in modified form. A 1972 study group in England, the Criminal
Law Revision Committee, proposed giving only the witness-spouse the right to invoke
the adverse testimony privilege, the approach ultimately taken in Trammel. Id. at 49
n. 10. These recommendations were enacted by Parliament in section 80 of the Police
and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984. See ZANDER, THE POLICE AND CRIMINAL EVI-
DENCE ACT OF 1984, 117-19 (1985).
When Trammel was decided, 17 states had abolished the adverse testimony privilege.
Since then, the state trend of abandoning the privilege has continued. Four additional
states have eliminated the privilege (although in one case the legislature reenacted the
privilege after it had been abolished through judicial action). The following jurisdic-
tions have abolished the adverse testimony privilege in criminal cases since the Supreme
Court's decision in Trammel: Iowa, 1983 Iowa Acts ch. 37, § 7 (amending IOWA CODE
ANN. § 726.4 (1979)); Nebraska, 1984 Neb. Laws L.B. 696, § 1 (amending NEB. REV.
STAT. § 27-505 (1943) to exclude from privilege enumerated crimes including crimes of
violence); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 11-505 (1983); North Carolina, abolished
by judicial action in State v. Freeman, 302 N.C. 591, 276 S.E.2d 450 (1981), but subse-
quently reinstated by legislative action. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-57 (1985) (witness-spouse
controls).
Jurisdictions which had abolished the privilege in criminal cases prior to Trammel
are: Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2232 (Supp. 1985); Arkansas, ARK. R.
EVID. 501 & 504; Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3502 (1970); Delaware, DEL.
R. EVID. 504(d) (may testify for or against each other); Florida, FLA. STAT. §§ 90.501,
90.504(3) (1979); Illinois, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 155-1, ch. 110, 8-801 (1984);
Indiana, IND. CODE § 34-1-14-5 (1976); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-407 & 60-428
(1976); Maine, ME. R. EvID. 501 & 504; New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 516:27 (1974); New York, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.10 (1971); North Dakota,
N.D. R. EVID. 501 & 504; Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2504 (West 1980);
South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-30 (Law Co-op. 1985); South Dakota, S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 19-13-12 to 19-13-15 (1987); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN.
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It was originally designed to serve the rule that spouses were incom-
§§ 24-1-201, 40-17-104 (1980); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1605 (1973); Wis-
consin, WIS. STAT. § 905.05 (1975).
The party-spouse still controls the privilege in Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-
107 (1985 Supp.).
The witness-spouse controls the privilege in: Alabama, ALA. CODE § 12-21-227
(1975); California, CAL. EVID. CODE § 970-3 (West 1979); Connecticut, CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 54-84a (West 1985); District of Columbia, D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-306
(1981); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 38-1604 (1981); Hawaii, HAW. R. EVID. 505; Ken-
tucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.210 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1986); Louisiana, LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 5:461(2) (West 1981); Maryland, MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 9-106 (1974); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20 (West
1986); Nevada, NEv. REV. STAT. § 49.295 (1986); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 40.255
(1981); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-17-10 (1981); Texas, TEX. CRIM. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 38.11 (Vernon 1979); Utah, UTAH CONST. art. I, § 12; UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-24-8(1) (1987).
The privilege is controlled by either the witness or party-spouse in: Alaska, ALASKA
CRIM. PROC. R. 26(b)(2), ALASKA R. EvID. 505; Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 9-203 (1979);
Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2162 (West 1986); Minnesota, MINN.
STAT. § 595.02 (1979); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 546.260 (Vernon 1987); Montana,
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-16-212 (1979); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A-84A-17(l)
& (2) (West 1976); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-271.2 (1983 Cum. Supp.); Wash-
ington, WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(1) (1979); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE § 57-3-3
(1966).
Spouses are incompetent to testify in: Mississippi, MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-5 (1979);
Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.42 (Baldwin 1979), OHIO R. EVID. 601 (B); Penn-
sylvania, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5913, 5915 (Purdon 1979); Wyoming, WYO.
STAT. § 1-12-104 (1985).
This trend demonstrates a rejection of Trammel's modified approach of placing the
privilege in the hands of the witness-spouse. Instead of following the Supreme Court's
lead, the privilege was rejected in toto. Even in those jurisdictions which have retained
it, the applicability of the privilege has been restricted. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2,
§§ 2240, 2245.
The privilege appears in neither the Model Code of Evidence nor the Uniform Rules
of Evidence. The Model Code of Evidence states:
It is now generally agreed that these considerations cannot justify.., a privi-
lege either in the witness-spouse to refuse to testify or in the party-spouse to
prevent the other from testifying. They are, however, currently thought by
legislators and judges to be sufficient to require the creation or maintenance of
a privilege for confidential communications between husband and wife.
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 215 comment a (1942). 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2,
§ 2228, at 221. Uniform Rule of Evidence 23(2) comment (1953) states: "This abol-
ishes the rule, still existing in some states, and largely a sentimental relic, of not requir-
ing one spouse to testify against the other in a criminal action. It limits the privilege to
confidential communications between the spouses .... 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2,
§ 2228, at 221. Additionally, in 1938 an American Bar Association committee on im-
proving the law of evidence called for the abolition of the privilege. The American Bar
Association Committee on the Improvements in the Law of Evidence, Report, in 63
REPORTS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 570, 594-95 (1938), stated:
Husband and wife at common law were... privileged not to testify against the
other nor to be testified against by the other.... The privilege has been abol-
ished in only a few States; but a tendency to extend the abolition has recently
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petent, a precept long since abandoned. 26 Yet, the privilege
lingered on in search of a rationale. 27 In light of the competing
interest in the truth-seeking process, unquestioning adherence to
precedent does not make sense. The confidentiality of communica-
tions between husband and wife are protected by the confidential
communications privilege, not the adverse testimony privilege.
The two rationales which the courts substituted for spousal in-
competence are encouraging marital harmony and preventing the
"natural repugnance" of compelling one spouse to testify against
the other. When spousal incompetence justified the privilege, there
were few reasons for creating exceptions to it. Since the time
been apparent, not only for civil litigation but in criminal prosecutions.... It
is recommended that the privilege protecting from being called one against the
other be abolished (1) in civil cases, and (2) in criminal cases. [Vote of the
Committee: in favor 25, opposed 14.]
8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2228, at 220-21.
In 1974, the National Conference on Uniform State Laws revised its Uniform Rules
of Evidence and again rejected the adverse testimony privilege in favor of a confidential
communications privilege. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. at 48-50; see UNIF. R.
EvID. 504. However, in 1986, the Revised Uniform Rules were broadened by an
amendment to include an adverse testimony privilege, though with a number of excep-
tions. UNIF. R. EVID. 504 reads in part:
(b) Spousal privilege in criminal proceedings. The spouse of an accused in a
criminal proceeding has a privilege to refuse to testify against the accused
spouse.
(c) Exceptions. There is no privilege under this rule in . . . any criminal
proceeding in which a prima facie showing is made that the spouses acted
jointly in the commission of the crime charged, or in any proceeding in which
one spouse is charged with a crime or tort against the person or property of
(i) the other, (ii) a minor child of either, (iii) an individual residing in the
household of either, or (iv) a third person if the crime ... is committed in the
course of committing a crime . . . against any of the individuals previously
named in this sentence. The court may refuse to allow invocation of the privi-
lege in any other proceeding if the interests of a minor child of either spouse
may be adversely affected.
126 It has been suggested that forcing a spouse to testify will be a pointless exercise.
In many cases, according to this view, witness-spouses will choose to perjure themselves
rather than give damaging testimony against the party-spouses. Comment, The Hus-
band- Wife Privileges of Testimonial Non-Disclosure, 56 Nw. U.L. REV. 208, 210 (1961).
This same argument could be made regarding witness-spouses who testify in favor of
party-spouses. Their incentive is also to perjure themselves to support their spouse's
case. Yet, the rule of spousal incompetence has long since been abandoned. The re-
sponse ought not to be exclusion of spousal testimony. In both situations we are better
off placing our trust in the jury to evaluate the evidence. The nature of the witness'
relationship to the party will be brought to the jury's attention, and the jury will be free
to evaluate the evidence accordingly. But see Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 8, at
684.
12 7 See Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 81 (1958) (Stewart, J., concurring);
Comment, supra note 7, at 321.
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spousal incompetence was abandoned, the courts have developed a
fluctuating patchwork of exceptions to ensure that the policies
which currently support the privilege are served. Today, these ex-
ceptions have so jaded use of the privilege that its application has
become inconsistent and unprincipled. Because the privilege is prej-
udicial to the prosecution, and does not serve its goals of protecting
marital harmony, its continued use cannot be justified.
A. The Adverse Testimony Privilege Fails to Serve the Policies
Which Arguably Support It
If the adverse testimony privilege is to be justified on policy
grounds, the benefits of preventing family discord'28 and avoiding
the "natural repugnance" of condemning a person with the testi-
mony of a spouse129 must outweigh the social costs of losing valua-
ble evidence at trial.13° On balance, the benefits do not support
continuation of the privilege.
128 Comment, supra note 7, at 318 ("delicate balance between the protection of mari-
tal harmony and confidential communications on the one hand, and the procurement of
facts on the other"). The earliest statement of the concern about marital harmony ap-
pears to be in 1628 in Coke's Commentaries Upon Littleton. Coke writes: "[A] wife
cannot be produced either against or for her husband, qua sunt duae animae in came
una [because they are two souls in one body]; and it might be a cause of implacable
discord and dissention between the husband and wife .... E. COKE, COMMENTARIES
UPON LITTLETON § 6b (1628), quoted in Lempert, supra note 2, at 728 n.10.
129 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2227, at 212; Note, supra note 39, at 203; Com-
ment, supra note 7, at 310.
130 See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980): "[W]e must decide
whether the privilege against adverse spousal testimony promotes sufficiently important
interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence in the administration of criminal
justice." Wigmore offers a forceful argument regarding the importance of this factor:
The whole life of the community, the regularity and continuity of its rela-
tions, depends upon the coming of a witness. Whether the achievements of
the past shall be preserved, the energy of the present kept alive and the ambi-
tions of the future be realized depends upon whether the daily business of
regulating rights and redressing wrongs shall continue without a moment's
abatement, or shall suffer a fatal cessation. The business of the particular
cause is petty and personal, but the results that hang upon it are universal. All
society, potentially, is involved in each individual case. The vital process of
justice must continue unceasingly. A single cessation typifies the prostration
of society. A series would involve its dissolution. The pettiness and personal-
ity of the individual trial disappear when we reflect that our duty to bear testi-
mony runs not to the parties in that present cause, but to the community at
large and forever.
8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2192, at 73; see also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 42,
§ 72, at 171: "[T]he rules of privilege ... are not designed or intended to facilitate the
fact-finding process or to safeguard its integrity. Their effect instead is clearly inhibi-
tive; rather than facilitating the illumination of truth, they shut out the light." Cf.
Krattenmaker, supra note 37, at 93 ("[T]rial court fact finding in this country has long
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1. Harmony of Marriage
Persistent questions have been raised concerning the justifications
of the privilege on the ground of protecting marital harmony. 3'
Wigmore has suggested that the privilege is not well tailored to
meet this end.' 32 In many cases in which the privilege is applied,
the marital relationship is already in serious trouble.' 33 Wigmore
further questioned whether harmony between a husband and wife is
closely tied to the testimony of one against the other. He argued
that many circumstances contribute to creating marital dissension
and that giving testimony is a casual and minor one which should
not be the foundation for so important a rule of evidence.' Wig-
more's argument is supported by the fact that there is an absence of
empirical evidence concerning the proposition that adverse testi-
mony causes significant damage to a marital relationship.'
Wigmore also found a certain irony in the balance struck between
society's interest and that of the marital parties. If A has wronged
B, and A's spouse's testimony is needed to establish the wrong, is it
a sensible policy to protect A's marriage at the expense of B's ability
been and presently is encumbered by exclusion of such evidence, yet does not appear to
have suffered noticeably for it.")
131 Marriage has been seen as the foundation of the family, Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888)), and as mak-
ing an important contribution to the rehabilitation of a criminal defendant spouse,
United States v. Van Drunen, 501 F.2d 1393, 1397 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1091 (1974). An extreme view is that marriage is sacred and nothing should be done to
endanger the relationship. Comment, supra note 7, at 311. On the other hand, as one
commentator noted:
Whether there exists any real justification for the marital testimonial privilege
remains the subject of debate. That the social policy of preserving marital
harmony has no relation in fact to the privilege and is "merely a sentiment"
will continue to be asserted by some and denied by others. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court has indicated that the privilege is not apt to disappear soon as
an evidentiary concept. It is, however, subject to further modification.
Note, The Joint Participation Exception, supra note 91, at 663.
132 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2228, at 216.
133 Id. It has been noted that even Judge Learned Hand refused to allow a wife to
testify after her husband had deserted her and remarried. His position was that even if,
as a factual matter, the marriage had failed, it was not the role of the courts to inquire
as to the viability of the marriage. United States v. Walker, 176 F.2d 564, 568 (2d Cir.
1949). According to one commentator, "One can only admire a marriage that remained
sufficiently harmonious despite the wife's desertion and remarriage that it was vulnera-
ble to further discord should the first husband testify against the wife." Lempert, supra
note 2, at 729.
134 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2228, at 216.
135 See Rosenberg, The New Looks in Law, 52 MARQUETTE L. REV. 539, 540-42
(1969-70); Developments in the Law, supra note 8, at 1580.
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to prove the wrong? 3 6 According to some commentators, the privi-
lege protects little more than the wrongdoer who hides behind it. 37
The changing role of the family in modem society supports this
skepticism over the effectiveness of the privilege. Significantly, the
divorce rate has risen to the point where, for many, marriage is only
a temporary relationship.' 38 Two commentators have taken the po-
sition that "[i]n this period of readjustment, we can see no reason
for sacrificing individual justice (as it has demonstrably been sacri-
ficed in several cases) to a mythical family unity."' 39
There is, on the other hand, a competing view of how the balance
should be struck. 140 It asserts that while compelling a spouse's tes-
timony will not necessarily destroy the marriage, neither will it nec-
essarily produce a just result.' If the testimony is ultimately
unnecessary to ensure conviction, justice will not have been served.
Likewise, no one gains if the spouse refuses to testify and is held in
contempt. Nor is justice advanced if the witness-spouse commits
perjury. 142
The problem with this approach is that "justice" is defined retro-
actively, after the testimony has been given and its effects seen. Un-
fortunately, courts lack the foresight to determine how a case will
be resolved and which elements will be critical to its resolution. In
the absence of insight into the future, the court should strike the
balance against a claim of privilege which prevents introduction of
relevant testimony. 
14 3
In theory, the adverse testimony privilege, when compared to the
136 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2228, at 216-17. Though some might respond that
in a criminal case, A is viewed as having wronged the state, not B, the state has an
interest in both protecting marriage and punishing the harm caused by A.
137 See Comment, supra note 7, at 321; Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 8, at 686
(invoking the marital privilege amounts to a sacrifice of justice).
138 Comment, supra note 7, at 321. It has been estimated that one-half of first mar-
riages of young adults in the United States will end in divorce. Note, Parent-Child
Loyalty and Testimonial Privilege, 100 HARV. L. REV. 910, 919 n.51 (1987) (citing
Glick, Marriage, Divorce, and Living Arrangements.: Prospective Changes, 5 J. FAM.
ISSUES 7, 15 (1984)).
139 Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 8, at 679.
140 Lempert, supra note 2, at 731.
141 Id.
142 Id. Yet another policy ground offered in support of the privilege is to rid the
courts of perjured testimony. See Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 75 (1958);
Reutlinger, supra note 37, at 1363; Note, Partners in Crime, supra note 91, at 1023.
143 Furthermore, the Trammel compromise of letting the witness-spouse decide
whether to testify does not resolve these problems. Instead, it often results in pressure
being put on the witness-spouse to testify "voluntarily," thus potentially creating mari-
tal disharmony.
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confidential communications privilege, affects relatively few
couples. The purpose of the confidential communications privilege
is to encourage free and open communications between spouses,
whether or not they end up in court.'" If confidential communica-
tion between spouses is motivated by the existence of the privilege,
an admittedly questionable assumption, 4 5 eliminating the privilege
could affect communication between a significant number of
couples.
By contrast, the adverse testimony privilege is not designed to
protect interspousal relations predating invocation of the privi-
lege.' 46 Rather, it is justified on the basis of its effect after one
spouse is called as a witness against the other. Furthermore,
although the confidential communications privilege is limited to
conversations between spouses, the adverse testimony privilege is
applicable to any testimony given by the witness-spouse. Thus, the
adverse testimony privilege only applies in the relatively small
number of cases which actually go to trial and in which a spouse is a
witness. Consequently, its abolition would permit the introduction
of potentially critical evidence while harming relatively few couples.
The privilege has been held inapplicable to disclosures made by
the witness-spouse outside of court. 147 Theoretically, a spouse
could cooperate with the government1 48 yet refuse to testify at trial
by invoking the privilege. Once the cooperation becomes known,
144 "For in protecting those relatively few confidential utterances that do bear upon
concrete litigation, the law protects all those that may." Krattenmaker, supra note 37,
at 92.
145 It has been argued that even the confidential communications privilege does not
actually serve its policy rationale of encouraging confidential marital relations. In con-
sidering the history of the family unit, two commentators argue: "[O]ne may seriously
doubt that the law of evidence had any formative effect on family life in general. Too
few people get into court, and the adjective law is little known outside of it. Family
unity there was, beyond reasonable doubt. But evidence was merely parallel to it."
Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 8, at 677.
146 See Developments in the Law, supra note 8, at 1580. Professor Lempert argues
that it misses the point to state that the adverse testimony privilege has little effect on
most marriages. His concern "is not with the ordinary marriage where the liability to
give testimony remains inchoate but with the [admittedly] rare marriage where but for
the privilege the testimony would be forced. In these cases the liability to give testi-
mony might well be a cause of substantial dissension ...." Lempert, supra note 2, at
731 (citation omitted). What Professor Lempert fails to do is take the next step and
weigh protecting the hypothetical risk of discord in those rare situations against the
more definite risk of losing evidence at trial.
147 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 52 n. 12 (1980).
148 See United States v. Burton, 631 F.2d 280, 282 (4th Cir. 1980) (wife may be inter-
viewed by probation officer preparing presentencing report for party-spouse).
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the potential for harm to the marital relationship is as great or per-
haps even greater than in-court testimony. The harm would be
greater if it became apparent that, but for the cooperation, the
party-spouse might never have been apprehended or indicted.
Our legal system is concerned with determining truth and main-
taining the appearance of impartiality. While these are not abso-
lutes, they should only give way to more compelling interests. That
the adverse testimony privilege applies to criminal cases is a signifi-
cant factor in the balance of interests. Not only does society have a
general interest in just adjudication, it also has an interest in main-
taining order through its criminal laws.I49 Jeremy Bentham, a lead-
ing critic of the adverse testimony privilege, considered whether
domestic happiness outweighs the state's interests:
It disturbs domestic confidence. Whose? Those who abuse it to
disturb the public security. A miscreant, then, who could be
convicted of an atrocious crime by the testimony of a woman,
has nothing to fear, if he has only time to go through the mar-
riage ceremony! No asylum ought to be opened for criminals;
every sort of confidence among them must be destroyed, if possi-
ble, even in the interior of their own houses. If they can neither
find mercenary protectors among the lawyers, nor concealment
at their own firesides, what harm is done? Why, they are com-
pelled to obey the laws, and live like honest people!1 O
Ultimately, the utilitarian approach to the privilege, that social
benefits must outweigh social costs for the privilege to continue, is
insufficient.151 The approach does not adequately protect marital
harmony because once the need for the spouse's testimony increases
beyond the value of the particular relationship, the privilege must
give way. Therefore, supporters of the privilege must look to an-
other rationale to justify its continued existence.' 52
149 The Supreme Court has expressed the view that "the twofold aim [of criminal
justice] is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer." Berger v. United States, 295
U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
150 J. BENTHAM, A TREATISE ON JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 238 (M. Dumont ed. 1825).
Bentham's extreme position would eliminate the attorney-client privilege as well as the
adverse testimony privilege.
151 Note, supra note 49, at 185-87 (the utilitarian rationale forces judges to place
values on individual relationships to decide which marriages are worthy of protection);
see also R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 184-207 (1977) (arguing for the
recognition of certain individual needs regardless of the social cost); C. FRIED, RIGHT
AND WRONG 36-37 (1978); Levinson, Testimonial Privileges and the Preferences of
Friendship, 1984 DUKE L.J. 631, 633.
152 Wigmore offered four criteria necessary for the creation of a privilege against dis-
closure of communications. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2285, at 527. Since the
adverse testimony privilege is not a privilege against communications, but instead a
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Some argue that the adverse testimony privilege embodies an im-
portant statement about social attitudes toward marriage.' 53 Be-
cause the privilege may play a role in keeping some marriages
together in a stressful time, or help avoid the anguish of one spouse
being forced to testify against the other, it is argued that the privi-
lege is justified.' 54 While it may be indisputable that, in theory,
marriage deserves protection, the question is at what price? Mar-
riage is no longer the only intimate relation in which two people
may live. The concept of a couple "living together" has gained in-
creasing acceptance; even having children out of wedlock by choice
has become more popular. Homosexual relationships can be just as
intimate as marriage. Beyond these are many other close family
relationships, such as those between parent and child, which do not
receive protection through an evidentiary privilege. Aside from in-
ertia, there is no apparent reason why marriage should continue to
receive this extraordinary protection.
2. Natural Repugnance
The second most commonly offered policy ground justifying the
adverse testimony privilege is one based on a visceral reaction to
what happens in court when there is no privilege. Some believe that
there is a "natural repugnance" to the prospect of compelling one
spouse to testify against the other.'55 Once stated, little more is ad-
ded by way of reasoning, logic, or history to support or elaborate on
this policy ground.
In responding to a critique of the marital privilege by Jeremy
privilege against testimony by certain types of witnesses, Wigmore's test is inapplicable.
For example, the first criterion is that the communication be made in confidence. Id.
The adverse testimony privilege, however, may be invoked even if the testimony does
not concern confidential communications.
Wigmore recognized that even the confidential communications privilege might not
meet his fourth criterion: the injury of disclosure is greater than the benefit that would
result from receipt of the testimony. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2332, at 642-43.
He concluded, however, that since the other three criteria (confidential communication,
confidence is essential to the relationship, and relation should be encouraged by the law)
are so fully satisfied that the confidential communications privilege should be recog-
nized. Id.
153 Lempert, supra note 2, at 736.
15 4 1d. at 736-37.
155 See Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525, 535 (1960) (Warren, J., dissenting);
United States v. Gonella, 103 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1939); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2,
§ 2228, at 217; see also Rothstein, The Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 62 GEO. L.J. 125, 131-32 (1973) ("popular aversion to testimony by one
spouse against the other"); Note, Partners in Crime, supra note 91, at 1023 ("repug-
nance to the conviction of an individual through the testimony of his or her spouse").
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Bentham, Wigmore commented on the "natural repugnance" pol-
icy. Wigmore provided a damning critique:
This reason, if we reflect upon it, is at least founded on a fact,
and it seems after all to constitute the real and sole strength of
the opposition to abolishing the privilege. Let it be confessed,
then, that this feeling exists, and that it is a natural one. But
does it suffice as a reason for the rule? In the first place, it is not
more than a sentiment. It does not posit any direct and practical
consequence of evil. It is much the same reason that anyone
might give for abolishing the office of spies in a war. In the next
place, it exemplifies that general spirit of sportsmanship which,
as elsewhere seen, so permeates the rules of procedure inherited
from our Anglo-Norman ancestors. The process of litigation
(many learned judges agree) is a noble kind of sport, and certain
rules of fair play should never be overstepped. One of these is to
give something of a start to the victim of the chase, to follow him
by certain rules only and to respect his feelings so far as may be.
This complicates the sport, and adds zest for the pursuers by in-
creasing the skill and art required by them for success. The expe-
dient of convicting a man out of the mouth of his wife is (let us
say) poor sport, and we shall not stoop to it. Such is the theory
and the sentiment of sportsmanship.
1 6
A related argument in support of the privilege is that it enhances
public acceptance of the legal system. The public might perceive
the system as unfair if a witness-spouse were coerced into testifying,
or if the spouse's desire not to testify were ignored.' 57 Counterbal-
ancing this argument, however, is the public's adverse reaction to a
criminal defendant going free because the defendant's spouse,
whose testimony might have led to a conviction, was excused from
testifying. It is also not clear that rules of evidence should be based
on public opinion.
The concern about natural repugnance is, to some extent, a short-
hand and ill-founded argument that privileges ought to protect
human dignity and the privacy of relationships. Viewed as a ques-
tion of values, one asks: Does the state value the judicial process
and the results it achieves more than the protection of personal rela-
tionships and individual feelings? This choice should not present
such a distressing dilemma, There is, on the one hand, a concrete
need for the information sought in the judicial system, and on the
other hand, only an abstract harm to the individual or society
caused by the process of obtaining the information. Moreover, even
if the concern about destroying relationships is valid, it must be
156 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2228, at 217.
157 Developments in the Law, supra note 8, at 1585-86.
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measured against the strong need for evidence. Litigation inher-
ently intrudes on privacy and human dignity and, unfortunately,
there is a substantial cost to protecting those values. In the case of
the adverse testimony privilege (assuming the retention of the confi-
dential communications privilege), the cost is not justified given the
speculative nature of the potential harm which would result without
a privilege. 58
B. Right to Privacy as Rationale for the Privilege
Given the weak policy foundation upon which the adverse testi-
mony privilege has been built, there has been an effort to find sup-
port for the privilege in the constitutional right to privacy. 159 If
constitutionally based, both federal and state courts would have to
recognize the privilege. According to this approach, the constitu-
tional protection of the institution of marriage extends to ongoing
marital relations. By compelling one spouse to testify against the
other, the state forces the witness to choose between loyalty to
spouse and loyalty to state. The adverse testimony privilege
removes this dilemma, or at least removes the coercion of a possible
contempt citation, and allows the witness-spouse to remain faithful
to the relationship if that is the spouse's greater loyalty.' 6° Courts
presented with this argument have consistently declined to find a
constitutional rationale for the adverse testimony privilege.
16 1
The constitutional justification stretches the right to privacy be-
158 In considering the confidential communications privilege, the Seventh Circuit
stated: "Protecting the truth-seeking function of a trial should not be outweighed by
oversensitivity to 'embarrassing' testimony .... " United States v. Byrd, 750 F.2d 585,
593 (7th Cir. 1984); see C. MCCORMICK, supra note 42, § 86.
159 Since the seminal article by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis on the right to
privacy, Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890), the
courts have expanded the right to protect matters relating to the marital relationship as
well as protecting private relationships generally. Court opinions have limited govern-
ment interference in decisions relating to abortion, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
contraception, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), although, recently, not
sodomy, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). The right to marry without govern-
ment interference has been held to be a fundamental right. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374, 383-86 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); see also Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) ("Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the
very existence and survival of the [human] race.")
160 Developments in the Law, supra note 8, at 1584-85.
161 See, e.g., Port v. Heard, 764 F.2d 423, 430 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Lefko-
witz, 618 F.2d 1313, 1319 (9th Cir. 1980); LaRoche v. Wainwright, 599 F.2d 722, 726
(5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Doe, 478 F.2d 194, 195 (1st Cir. 1973); see also United
States v. Hicks, 420 F. Supp. 533, 536 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (privilege is not constitutionally
based and can be altered or even abolished at will).
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yond all accepted bounds. The communications most logically pro-
tected by the right to privacy, those made in confidence between
husband and wife, are already protected by the confidential commu-
nications privilege. What remains is testimony about nonconfiden-
tial matters, the knowledge of which did not necessarily arise from
the marital relationship. There is no legitimate expectation that
marriage immunizes one spouse from testimony by the other spouse
concerning matters that are neither confidential nor private.
Although several Supreme Court decisions have provided protec-
tion for the right to marry, that right is not implicated by the in-
court testimony of one spouse against the other.
162
Some believe that the Supreme Court's decision in Branzburg v.
Hayes 163 forecloses any hope of recognizing a broad constitution-
ally-based marital privilege." 6 Despite empirical data, the Court
failed to recognize a reporter's privilege arguably based on first
amendment rights, suggesting a hostility towards creating new
privileges. 165
The Court's refusal to uphold a parent-child privilege further ex-
emplifies its reluctance to create privileges with constitutional foun-
dations. While there is ample support from commentators, 66 only
162 By contrast, application of the right to privacy to the confidential communica-
tions privilege is more logical. Requiring that confidential conversations be recounted
in court intrudes into the private aspects of the relationship, possibly violating an expec-
tation of privacy held by the spouses when the communications were made. Cf. Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (justifiable reliance on privacy of phone booth).
Even the confidential communications privilege, however, would not be appropriate for
constitutional protection. In balancing the strong state interest in just adjudication, the
threat to the right to make family decisions is not "sufficiently grievous ... to establish a
constitutional [privilege]." Note, supra note 49, at 199 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429
U.S. 589, 600 (1977)).
163 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
164 Krattenmaker, supra note 37, at 96-98.
165 Id. Subsequent empirical data has demonstrated that despite the Court's refusal
to create a privilege, the press continues to rely on confidential news sources. Surveyed
reporters stated that they continued to use confidential sources after Branzburg in
roughly the same percentage as they did before the decision. News coverage has not
been adversely affected by the possibility that reporters would have to disclose confiden-
tial information. Osborn, The Reporter's Confidentiality Privilege. Updating the Empir-
ical Evidence After a Decade of Subpoenas, 17 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 57, 72-75
(1985).
166 See, e.g., Coburn, Child-Parent Communications: Spare the Privilege and Spoil the
Child, 74 DICK. L. REV. 599 (1970); Stanton, Child-Parent Privilege for Confidential
Communications: An Examination and Proposal, 16 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1982); Comment,
From the Mouths of Babes: Does the Constitutional Right of Privacy Mandate a Parent-
Child Privilege?, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1002 (1978); Comment, The Child-Parent Privi-
lege: A Proposal, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 771 (1979); Comment, Confidential Communi-
cations Between Parent and Child: A Constitutional Right, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 811
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a handful of jurisdictions have recognized such a privilege.167 Sig-
nificantly, advocates of the parent-child privilege argue that it pro-
tects only confidential communications and not adverse
testimony.1 68 Judicial hostility to creation of new privileges, espe-
cially those with constitutional rationales, bodes ill for the recogni-
tion of constitutional dimensions to the adverse testimony privilege.
IV
PROPOSAL TO ABOLISH THE PRIVILEGE
During the history of the adverse testimony privilege, courts have
puzzled over its uncertain origins, developed numerous exceptions
to avoid its application, and yet voiced an unwillingness to do away
with it, 1 69 probably due to the inertia which accompanies a 400-
year-old privilege. All the while, commentators have urged the
elimination of the privilege which they have referred to as an
"archaic survival,"' 7 ° "merest anachronism,"' 1 and "sentimental
relic." ' 72 As Dean Wigmore concluded, "[r]eform in this area of
the law is long overdue."' 
73
The Supreme Court has consistently been critical of evidentiary
privileges, reasoning that privileges "are not lightly created nor ex-
pansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for
(1979); Comment, Underprivileged Communications: The Rationale for a Parent-Child
Testimonial Privilege, 36 Sw. L.J. 1175 (1983); Comment, Parent-Child Testimonial
Privilege: Preserving and Protecting the Fundamental Right to Family Privacy, 52 U.
CIN. L. REV. 901 (1983). However, not all commentators endorse the privilege. See,
e.g., Note, Questioning the Recognition of a Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege, 45 ALB.
L. REV. 142 (1980).
167See, e.g., In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Nev. 1983); In re Greenberg, 11
Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (Callaghan) 579 (D. Conn. 1982); Developments in the Law, supra
note 8, at 1575.
168 Developments in the Law, supra note 8, at 1575-76.
169 "[T]he long history of the privilege suggests that it ought not to be casually cast
aside." Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 48 (1980); see also Note, supra note 39,
at 210 ("The marital privileges should not be abolished. The privileges are judicial
constructs evolving over centuries .... ") (footnote omitted); Lempert, supra note 2, at
736-37 ("I support the privilege .... I am willing to trade a bit of justice for a bit of
humanity.") On the other hand, the Supreme Court in Trammel demonstrated a nota-
ble lack of enthusiasm for the privilege, and stated that it should be construed narrowly
in the future. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. at 50.
170 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 42, § 66, at 162-63 ("The privilege is an archaic sur-
vival of a mystical religious dogma and of a way of thinking about the marital relation
that is today outmoded.") (footnote omitted).
171 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2228, at 221 ("[The] marital privilege is the merest
anachronism in legal theory and an indefensible obstruction to truth in practice.")
172 Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 81 (1958) (Stewart, J., concurring).
173 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2245, at 265.
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truth."'' 74 It follows that if a privilege which has been strictly ap-
plied and subsequently modified no longer adequately serves its un-
derlying policy rationales, it should be abolished.
Application of the adverse testimony privilege, especially since
Trammel, demonstrates that the time has come to eliminate the
privilege. This is not to say that marriage is no longer deserving of
respect or protection. It is only an acknowledgment that the privi-
lege, even as reformed, does a poor job of protecting marriage and
deprives the judicial system of valuable testimony. 175
A. Reform Is Not an Adequate Solution
In criticizing the adverse testimony privilege, a number of courts
and commentators have suggested modifying the privilege. None of
the proposed changes provides a satisfactory response to the defi-
ciencies of the privilege.
One commentator acknowledges that the privilege serves little or
no purpose in most cases and instead obstructs the discovery of
truth. 176 Rather than abolish the privilege, however, he suggested
that a party claiming the privilege bear the burden of showing the
174 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974); see also Herbert v. Lando, 441
U.S. 153, 175 (1979) ("Evidentiary privileges in litigation are not favored, and even
those rooted in the Constitution must give way in proper circumstances.") (footnote
omitted); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(Limitations on the truth-seeking process should be allowed "only to the very limited
extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public
good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means
for ascertaining truth."); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) ("the public
... has a right to every man's evidence.")
Several courts have taken these admonitions to heart in declining to create new evi-
dentiary privileges. See Matthews v. United States, 714 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1983) (declin-
ing to create an in-laws privilege); Unites States v. Jones, 683 F.2d 817 (4th Cir. 1982)
(parental privilege rejected).
175 "[W]e realize the possibility that the social benefit of the [adverse testimony] priv-
ilege may be minimal and that it could be dispensed with without serious erosion of
marriages." In re Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276, 280 (3d Cir. 1980).
At the same time, the confidential communications privilege should be retained. It
encourages free communication between spouses, much as the attorney-client privilege
does between attorney and client. One commentator argues that the post-Trammel de-
cisions demonstrate a unification of the adverse testimony and the confidential commu-
nications privileges in that the focus is now on protecting confidential marital
communications. See Comment, supra note 70, at 765-67. What the author fails to
consider is that the adverse testimony privilege is not in any way limited to preventing
disclosure of confidential communications. In a general sense it arguably helps preserve
the marriage so that future confidential communications may take place. There is, how-
ever, nothing in the recent court decisions that suggests it is this focus which dictates
the contours of the current privilege.
176 Comment, supra note 7, at 322.
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need for it based on the facts of the case.17 7 Only where it can be
shown that the testimony will cause "real damage" will the privi-
lege be sustained. 78 This approach would supposedly strike the
proper balance between the interests of society in ascertaining truth
and in preserving the marital relationship. 79 It does not explain,
however, how a judge would determine whether "real damage" will
result. Even a psychologist would have difficulty making accurate
predictions.
The Fifth Circuit articulated, but did not actually apply, a modi-
fication of the privilege. The court suggested a balancing test: "Ap-
plicability of the marital privilege is determined on a case-by-case
basis, after a careful balancing of the public's need for disclosure on
the one hand against the need to protect the marital relationship on
the other." ' The problem with this balancing test is how, as a
practical matter, a trial judge can possibly balance these two com-
peting concerns? As noted above, it is almost impossible to deter-
mine how a particular marriage will fare after one spouse adversely
testifies against another. Furthermore, how is a judge to weigh the
"public's" need for disclosure in any given case? If only the wit-
ness-spouse is capable of giving the particular testimony and it is
relevant, will the judge always overrule the privilege? If so, the
privilege will often, if not always, be rejected. If the privilege will be
overridden only for "important" testimony, how is a judge to know
mid-trial how much more the prosecution needs to convince the
jury of the defendant's guilt?
Another approach suggests expanding the privilege to
nonmarital, intimate relationships.' 8 ' Traditionally, the law's pro-
tection focused on the marital relationship because marriage was
considered part of the foundation of Western society. In recent
years, relationships outside of marriage have become more common
and accepted. If the privilege is to survive and be applied in a prin-
cipled manner, it would have to be extended to other kinds of inti-
mate relations and perhaps simultaneously be restricted in the case
of marriages where the intimacy has been lost or never existed. '82
The intimate relations privilege, like the adverse testimony privi-
177Id.
178Id.
179 Id.
1801n re Grand Jury Proceedings, 664 F.2d 423, 429 (former 5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982).
181 Developments in the Law, supra note 8, at 1589-90.
182See id. at 1582; Levinson, supra note 151, at 651-53. In response, it has been
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lege, would only be available to the witness, not the party. "Inti-
mate relationships" would include parent-child, unmarried
cohabitants, homosexual lovers, and "intimate" friends. 183 Propo-
nents of an intimate relations privilege argue that the law should
respect the individual's choice of an intimate relationship.1 84
A problem with this approach is that it fails to offer a logical or
even ascertainable point at which protection can be considered un-
necessary. Once some intimate relations are recognized, how can
others be excluded? Who is to say best friends, in-laws, and room-
mates should not receive protection?
B. Abolition is the Only Alternative
This Article suggests that the adverse testimony privilege be
abandoned completely and that only confidential marital communi-
argued that the marital relationship is unique in that it is easily destroyed through es-
trangement and divorce.
If the privilege were, for example, extended to those having a general family relation-
ship, it would be impossible to draw the line. Children, brothers, sisters, and even those
only related by marriage would be included within the privilege. See Port v. Heard, 594
F. Supp. 1212, 1219-20 (S.D. Tex. 1984), aff'd, 764 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1985).
183 The law would recognize a rebuttable presumption for certain accepted relation-
ships such as marriage, parent-child, and couples who have lived together for more than
two years. A member of any other relationship would have the burden of convincing
the court that their particular relationship had the requisite degree of intimacy. Devel-
opments in the Law, supra note 8, at 1591-92; see also Krattenmaker, Interpersonal Tes-
timonial Privileges Under the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Suggested Approach, 64
GEO. L.J. 613, 664 (1976) (communications should be presumptively privileged if made
"between individuals intimately related or in a position of close personal trust"). No
specific guidance is given as to how the court is to determine how much intimacy there
must be before the privilege will apply. At least the marital privilege has the virtue of
making identification of protected witnesses easier. See Levinson, supra note 151, at
648.184 See Levinson, supra note 151, at 645 (questioning why intimate and family rela-
tions outside of marriage are not protected). A commentator promoting this expanded
privilege argues that marriage is a "male-dominated institution" and that limiting the
privilege to marriage is thus harmful to women. Developments in the Law, supra note 8,
at 1590-91. According to the author:
One explanation of family privilege law suggests that the male-dominated
structure of our society accounts for the limitation of family privileges to mar-
ital relationships. This explanation argues from the premise that the legal in-
stitution of traditional marriage supports husbands' dominion over wives. ...
Although marital privileges do not directly promote male domination, they
help to maintain male power by promoting the institution of marriage ....
The feminist power theory provides a particularly persuasive explanation of
the historical development of marital privileges.
Id. at 1586.
The adverse testimony privilege has traditionally protected men from their wives'
testimony. To this extent the privilege itself is discriminatory.
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cations be protected by a privilege. In Trammel, the Supreme
Court chose to modify rather than abolish the privilege despite
Dean Wigmore's arguments against it.'" While acknowledging the
criticism of the privilege, the Court deferred to inertia, noting "the
long history of the privilege suggests that it ought not to be casually
cast aside.' 6
Marital harmony would not be significantly harmed by elimina-
tion of the privilege in the few situations where it applies.'7 The
adverse testimony privilege only applies if the following facts are
present: the witness-spouse does not want to testify voluntarily; the
testimony does not concern confidential communications; the
spouse is legally and happily married; the spouse was not jointly
participating in criminal activity with the defendant; and the spouse
is not called upon to testify about a crime against him or herself or
his or her children. By definition, the privilege protects only invol-
untary testimony by a witness-spouse. How harmful is it to a rela-
tionship when a witness-spouse is forced to testify and face
contempt sanctions? Perhaps in extreme cases, the party-spouse
would expect the witness-spouse to refuse to testify and face con-
tempt sanctions. In many, if not most, other instances, where the
testimony is not very damaging or the potential punishment is not
great, the party-spouse can hardly expect the witness-spouse to do
anything but testify. The blame in such instances, if rationally
placed, would be on the prosecution and not on the spouse. This
fact, coupled with the strong need for the spouse's evidence, which
will often be highly credible, makes clear that any resultant harm is
185 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44-45 (1980). Dean Wigmore argued:
This privilege has no longer any good reason for retention. In an age which
has so far rationalized, depolarized, and de-chivalrized the marital relation
and the spirit of Femininity as to be willing to enact complete legal and polit-
ical equality and independence of man and woman, this marital privilege is the
merest anachronism, in legal theory, and an indefensible obstruction to truth,
in practice.
8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2228, at 221; see also Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S.
525, 536 n.5 (1960); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 755 F.2d 1022, 1026-27 (2d Cir. 1985);
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 42, § 66, at 162-63.
186 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. at 48.
187 As one judge noted:
If I were free to do so I would hold that the rule of Hawkins v. United States,
recognizing a privilege of one spouse not to testify against the interest of the
other, should be overruled, because it is based upon a supposititious impact of
such testimony upon that interspousal relationship in the future, which impact
has no support in any behavioral science evidence.
In re Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 1980) (Gibbons, J., concurring) (citation
omitted).
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insufficient to justify continuation of the adverse testimony
privilege.
The concern about the natural repugnance of one spouse impli-
cating the other spouse also fails to justify continuation of the privi-
lege. In Trammel, the Supreme Court stated:
It is argued that abolishing the privilege will permit the Govern-
ment to come between husband and wife, pitting one against the
other. That, too, misses the mark. Neither Hawkins, nor any
other privilege, prevents the Government from enlisting one
spouse to give information concerning the other or to aid in the
other's apprehension. It is only the spouse's testimony in the
courtroom that is prohibited.' 1
8
As the Court's comment implies, "natural repugnance" is not a
compelling rationale for upholding the privilege. By limiting the
privilege to testimony in the courtroom, the Court allows the wit-
ness-spouse to potentially harm the party-spouse and, presumably,
the marriage, by implicating the party-spouse in statements made
outside the courtroom. Little concern is demonstrated about the
effect of such out-of-court statements on the marriage.
Though many decisions since Trammel have found ways to cir-
cumvent the adverse testimony privilege, 189 many have upheld it. 190
Those cases which have upheld the privilege provide little support
for its continuation. In In re Grand Jury Proceedings,91 the court
upheld the privilege despite the fact that the marriage at issue took
place between grand jury appearances by the witness-spouse. It is
hard to see the need to protect marital harmony when the witness'
earlier testimony did not interfere with her marrying the target of
the investigation. The privilege was also upheld for testimony con-
cerning events prior to the marriage, which included all the testi-
mony sought. Admittedly, other courts have refused to apply the
privilege in such instances to avoid the necessity of minitrials on the
possibility of a sham marriage. 9
2
Another court surprisingly upheld the privilege in a situation in-
volving a former Assistant United States Attorney facing criminal
charges in another case.' 93 The defendants in the instant case
188 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. at 52 n.12 (emphasis added).
189 See discussion of exceptions to the privilege, supra PART II.
190 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 664 F.2d 423, 430 (5th Cir. 1982) (in a
prosecution for contempt, the spousal privilege was upheld regarding questions that
might reflect negatively on the defendant spouse's innocence).
191 640 F. Supp. 988 (E.D. Mich. 1986).
192 See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 712 F.2d 299, 302 (7th Cir. 1983).
193 United States v. Venuti, No. 84 CR 1002, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 1985)
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sought testimony to establish that the United States Attorney had
failed to seal surveillance tapes as required by law because of his
cocaine habit. The government attributed his lack of compliance to
overwork. The United States Attorney's wife, who was called to
testify about his activity, invoked the adverse testimony privilege.
Despite the fact that the couple had filed for divorce, the court up-
held the privilege due to the possibility of reconciliation. 194 With-
out facts supporting the marital harmony rationale, the court
placed special reliance on the natural repugnance rationale, rarely
an explicit ground for decision.' 95
In another extreme example, a federal court upheld an injunction
against a couple getting married, despite the woman's pregnancy, in
order to prevent the use of the adverse testimony privilege.1 96 To
this court, obtaining trial testimony was more important than any
highly speculative harm to the marriage. Ironically, the privilege,
which was designed to protect and preserve marriages, in this case
prevented one.
Even if there were some vitality to the privilege in those cases to
which it still applies, the fact that the exceptions have almost re-
placed the rule undermines the privilege's social benefit. Applica-
tion of the numerous exceptions diverts the attention of the court
from the determination of guilt to tangential issues such as the vital-
ity of the marriage. The large number of exceptions also provides
fertile ground for appeal, thus delaying resolution of cases and con-
suming judicial and prosecutorial resources.
Few of the exceptions which have been carved out serve the un-
derlying policies of the privilege. For example, courts often admit
out-of-court statements made by a spouse which lead to a convic-
tion of the other spouse. The joint participant exception also allows
testimony by one spouse to lead to the other's conviction, albeit jus-
tified by the spouses' cooperative criminal efforts. Likewise, the un-
usual holding in Ryan v. Commissioner,'97 where the court found a
marriage so strong that it needed no protection from the privilege
ignores the policies behind the privilege. Adverse testimony could
(available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). For the district court opinion, see
United States v. Venuti, 625 F. Supp. 1460 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
194 Id.
195 See id. This appears to be an empathetic reaction to a former prosecutor being
the object of scrutiny in a criminal case. It also demonstrates the danger of providing
the judge with too much discretion in applying the privilege.
196 Vance v. Rice, 524 F. Supp. 1297 (S.D. Iowa 1981).
197 568 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 820 (1978).
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harm even a strong marriage, and the fact that a marriage is strong
and long-lasting makes it no less repugnant when one spouse is the
tool by which the other is convicted.
Moreover, the privilege as it stands today does not correspond to
contemporary social realities about the institution of marriage. It is
illogical to limit the privilege to married couples when there are
many other relationships that deserve protection. However, ex-
panding the privilege to cover these relationships is no more
logical. 1
9 8
The Supreme Court has demonstrated its hostility to claims of
privilege, especially in the criminal context. 99 On balance, the in-
terests of the judicial system outweigh the interests protected by the
privilege, even assuming they have constitutional underpinnings. In
the case of the adverse testimony privilege, the constitutional argu-
ments are weak, while the interest in credible, relevant evidence is
compelling, given society's interest in protecting the public welfare
through enforcement of the law. The time has come to question the
worth of the adverse testimony privilege. The answer is that the
privilege is no longer worth the price.
198 To demonstrate the difficulty of expanding the privilege, one commentator pro-
posed a "fantasy" in which each citizen received privilege tickets to distribute to people
he or she interacted with in order to protect their relationships. Levinson, supra note
151, at 654-62. Aside from the insurmountable administrative problems, there would be
a tremendous burden on the individual in choosing to whom tickets should be given.
The current privilege at least has the virtue of not, albeit paternalistically, placing the
decision of which relationships are most valuable in the hands of the individual.
199 See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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